Many data producers seek to provide users access to confidential data without unduly compromising data subjects' privacy and confidentiality. When intense redaction is needed to do so, one general strategy is to require users to do analyses without seeing the confidential data, for example, by releasing fully synthetic data or by allowing users to query remote systems for disclosure-protected outputs of statistical models. With fully synthetic data or redacted outputs, the analyst never really knows how much to trust the resulting findings. In particular, if the user did the same analysis on the confidential data, would regression coefficients of interest be statistically significant or not? We present algorithms for assessing this question that satisfy differential privacy. We describe conditions under which the algorithms should give accurate answers about statistical significance. We illustrate the properties of the methods using artificial and genuine data.
Introduction
In many settings, data producers such as national statistical agencies, survey organizations, health systems, and private sector companies-henceforth all called agencies-seek to provide researchers and the broader public access to data on individual records. However, these agencies are ethically and often legally obligated to protect the confidentiality of data subjects' identities and sensitive attributes. Research has shown that stripping obvious identifiers, like names and While query systems and synthetic data are appealing options for data release, they have a significant drawback: it is difficult for analysts to know how much they should trust the results of their analyses. For example, in a query system, the user might ask for outputs from a regression model that, in actuality, fits poorly on the confidential data. This lack of fit cannot be easily discovered from the coefficients and standard errors alone, whether they are perturbed or not. Additionally, the steps taken to perturb the outputs could infuse substantial error into the reported coefficients. Similar dilemmas arise for synthetic data. By default, the synthetic data reflect only those distributional features and relationships encoded in the synthesis models (Reiter, 2005) . The synthesis model may fail to describe the data in ways that lead the analyst to findings that are not supported by the confidential data. Further, even when the synthesis models adequately describe the distributions in the confidential data, the process of generating synthetic data tends to increase standard errors, which could obscure important relationships.
The literature on privacy-preserving data analysis has begun to address aspects of this problem. Reiter (2003) suggests that linear regression output from query systems be accompanied by synthetic plots of residuals versus predicted values. Related residual diagnostics for logistic regressions are proposed in Reiter & Kohnen (2005) and O' Keefe & Good (2009) . Chen et al. (2016) present an algorithm for releasing residual plots (and also ROC curves for logistic regression) that satisfies differential privacy. Their algorithm takes as input the privately-estimated coefficients, which could come from noisy outputs or a synthetic data analysis. While useful diagnostic tools, these plots do not provide analysts with means to compare inferences obtained via the privacy-preserving mechanism to those that would be obtained from the confidential data. It may be, for example, that a particular regression coefficient of substantive interest has a large p-value in the noisy output or synthetic data, even though it has a small one in the confidential data, or vice versa.
In this article, we present algorithms for comparing the sign and significance level of privatelycomputed regression coefficients, i.e., those computed via output perturbation or via synthetic data, with those computed from the confidential data. We envision the outputs of these algorithms being delivered to users via a verification server (Reiter et al., 2009 ). This is a query system that allows users to ask for measures indicating how similar privately-computed results are to those based on the confidential data without allowing users to see the confidential data. The algorithms satisfy differential privacy, which has important benefits in this interactive context. As shown in Reiter et al. (2009) and McClure & Reiter (2012) , when verification servers provide exact (unperturbed) answers to queries about similarity of results, intruders can query the server repeatedly to gather information that, in combination, provides unacceptably tight ranges for individual confidential values. Differential privacy provides provable bounds for the amount of information leaked by the server over repeated queries, regardless of their nature.
The basic idea of the algorithm is built on the sub-sample aggregate mechanism of Nissim et al. (2007) and is as follows. We randomly partition the confidential data into M disjoint bins. In each bin, we estimate the regression using only the data in that bin, from which we compute the univariate t-statistics for the coefficients. We then truncate each t-statistic at some user-defined threshold a; this facilitates differentially private algorithm design, as we discuss later. For each coefficient of interest specified by the user, we average the truncated statistics. We add noise to this average sampled from a Laplace distribution with variance tuned to satisfy differential privacy. For each coefficient, we refer the resulting noisy statistic to an appropriate reference distribution under the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero, resulting in calibrated p-values. The p-value can be used directly as evidence of the significance of the coef-ficient, or it can be compared with the corresponding, privately-computed p-value for purposes of verification. The sign of the noisy t-statistic also provides a differentially private estimate of the sign of the coefficient.
We are not aware of algorithms for differentially private significance tests for linear regression coefficients like those we propose, although the literature on differential privacy includes related work. Several authors have developed differentially private significance tests for categorical data and contingency tables (e.g., Vu & Slavkovic, 2009; Gaboardi et al., 2016b; Wang et al., 2017) . Solea (2014) and D'Orazio et al. (2015) propose differentially private significance tests for the mean, and the difference of means, of Gaussian random variables, respectively, under the assumption that bounds for the mean or the data values are known. Multiple authors have developed differentially private algorithms for regression and other predictive modeling strategies (e.g., Chaudhuri & Monteleoni, 2009; Dwork & Lei, 2009; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2015; Kifer et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2012; Sarlós, 2006; Karwa et al., 2015; Honkela et al., 2016; Bassily et al., 2014) . None of these works provide procedures to compute standard errors, making it impossible to conduct significance tests. Sheffet (2015) presents an algorithm for estimating regressions that does provide standard errors; however, the algorithm sometimes returns output associated with a variant of ridge regression rather than strictly linear regression. The algorithm also requires all data values are bounded, which we do not require in our algorithms.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review differential privacy and some of the techniques used to design algorithms that satisfy it. In Section 3, we present the algorithm for the differentially private t-statistic, including a derivation of its reference distribution. In Section 4, we illustrate the performance of the algorithm with simulation studies. In Section 5, we present an approach for choosing the number of partitions and the threshold level. These drive the accuracy and usefulness of the outputs from the algorithm. In Section 6, we conclude with suggestions for implementation of these techniques, as well as discuss future research topics around verification of privately-computed regression quantities.
Review of Differential Privacy
Before reviewing differential privacy, we motivate why one should not simply release verification measures without redaction. Suppose that an agency has released synthetic data, from which a user estimates the intercept and slope in a regression of an outcome y on a single predictor x. Suppose that the verification server were to provide the value of the t-statistic for the slope in the confidential data. An ill-intentioned user could submit two verification requests, one with a particular individual and one without that individual, e.g., by subsetting purposefully on x. Differences in the two t-statistics reveal information about the excluded individual. For a simple example, when the t-statistic changes from a large negative value to a large positive value, the user might infer that the excluded individual's y i is a large value (when x i is also large), thereby potentially leaking sensitive information about this individual. As another example, suppose a worst case scenario: the user knows the values of (x i , y i ) for r records. If the user can submit a regression involving data comprising those r records plus one additional record, and then request the t-statistic for the slope of that regression, the user can try various combinations of (x i , y i ) for that unknown record until finding the set of values that yield the reported t-statistic.
As these examples illustrate, we need to redact the verification measures before releasing them, which we do using differential privacy. Let A be an algorithm that takes as input a database D and outputs some quantity o, i.e., A(D) = o. In our context, these outputs are used to form verification measures for the t-statistic and sign. Define neighboring databases, D and D , as databases that differ in one row and are identical for all other rows.
Definition 1 ( -differential privacy). An algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy if for any pair of neighboring databases (D, D ), and any output o ∈ range(A), the P r(
Intuitively, A satisfies -DP when the distributions of its outputs are similar for any two neighboring databases, where similarity is defined by the factor exp( ). The , also known as the privacy budget, controls the degree of the privacy offered by A, with lower values implying greater privacy guarantees. -DP is a strong criterion, since even an intruder who has access to all of D except any one row learns little from A(D) about the values in that unknown row when is small.
Differential privacy has three other properties that are appealing for verification measures. Let A 1 (·) and A 2 (·) be 1 -DP and 2 -DP algorithms. First, for any database D, releasing the outputs of both A 1 (D) and A 2 (D) ensures ( 1 + 2 )-DP. Thus, we can quantify and track the total privacy leakage from releasing verification measures. Second, releasing the outputs of both A 1 (D 1 ) and A 2 (D 2 ), where D 1 ∩ D 2 = ∅, satisfies max{ 1 , 2 }-DP. Third, for any algorithm A 3 (·), releasing A 3 (A 1 (D)) for any D still ensures 1 -DP. Thus, post-processing the output of -DP algorithms does not incur extra loss of privacy.
A common method for ensuring -DP, which we utilize for -DP verification measures, is the Laplace Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006) . For any function f :
are neighboring databases. This quantity, known as the global sensitivity of f , is the maximum L 1 distance of the outputs of the function f between any two neighboring databases. The Laplace Mechanism is
where η is a d × 1 vector of independent draws from a Laplace distribution with density p(x | λ) = (1/(2λ)) exp(−|x|/λ), where λ = ∆(f )/ .
To make differentially private verification measures, we also utilize the subsample and aggregate technique (Nissim et al., 2007) . This technique allows us to reduce the global sensitivity of f , thereby reducing the variance in the noise distribution. To implement this technique, we partition the dataset
, since any single observation appears in at most one of the partitions. Finally, we use the Laplace mechanism to release a noisy version of M
Differentially Private Test Statistics
We begin by laying out relevant notation and formally specifying our objectives. Let D be a confidential dataset comprising n individuals. For each individual i = 1, . . . , n, let y i ∈ R be its univariate response variable and
. An analyst seeks to estimate the parameters in the regression, y i = β x i + e i , where β = (β 0 , . . . , β p ) ∈ R p+1 and e i are i.i.d. random errors with E(e i ) = 0 and V ar(e i ) = σ 2 . We assume that, if the analyst had direct access to D, he or she would make inferences about each β j based on the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE),β j , and its corresponding sample distribution. However, the analyst does not get direct access to D; instead, the analyst can learn only the privately-computed estimatesβ j , which could arise from perturbed versions ofβ j or from synthetic data. Our key question is whether or not inferences about β j are similar when usingβ j orβ j .
To address this question, we develop differentially private significance tests. Let T (D) be the standardized estimator of β j obtained from D, that is,
where Σ j,j is the (j, j)th element of the matrix,Σ =σ Bhattacharya et al., 2016, section 6.8) . Hence, for a large enough n, the distribution of T (D) can be suitably approximated by a standard Gaussian distribution. In the remainder of the article, we refer to T (D) simply as the t-statistic.
T (D) provides all the information needed for inferences about the sign and significance of β j . Hence, we can address our key question and account for privacy by developing algorithms for releasing differentially private versions of T (D), along with deriving reference distributions for the private t-statistics. Taken together, these algorithms enable the analyst to assess the significance level for β j directly from the private output.
Unfortunately, we cannot simply apply the Laplace mechanism in (1) to create the differentially private test statistic, as the global sensitivity of T (D) is unbounded. A possible remedy is to work with some bounded statistic instead of T (D). For statistical significance, two obvious candidates include (i) the p-value associated with T (D) and (ii) a truncated version of T (D). We prefer the second approach, for reasons we now explain.
Let p
T be the p-value associated with T (D) for a two-tailed significance test of the null hypothesis β j = 0. Any p T has global sensitivity equal to one. Let p T, be the -differentially private p-value obtained after adding Laplace noise to p T based on the global sensitivity of one.
With high probability, adding this noise to small values of p T could inflate them so much as to change our opinion of the significance of β j . This is less problematic when adding noise to large values of p T . In other words, for a given , the probability that an analyst reaches the same decisions about statistical significance when using p T, or p T is higher when p T falls in an acceptance region for H 0 than when p T falls in a rejection region.
Regarding the second approach, let the truncated t-statistic be given by
where a > 0 is a user-defined parameter. Here, a has to be large enough to ensure that T (D) and T t (D) lead to the same conclusion regarding the null hypothesis with high probability. Because of the truncation, the global sensitivity of
be a noisy version of T t (D). With T t, (D), the problems are reversed. With undesirably high probability, adding noise to values of T t (D) near zero could make an insignificant effect appear significant, whereas the noise is not likely to change our opinion about significance when T (D) is large. Put another way, for a given , the probability that an analyst reaches the same decisions about statistical significance when using
The arguments above suggest that neither approach always outperforms the other. We opt for the second approach because
also allows the release of a noisy estimate of the sign of β j without additional expenditure of .
Two versions of private t-statistics
Since the length of the range of T t (D) coincides with its global sensitivity, the variance in the Laplace distribution is driven entirely by . This implies we need to use a large to ensure that T t, (D) is practically useful, perhaps larger than what we would like from the perspective of protecting privacy. Hence, we need to adapt the truncated t-statistic to reduce the global sensitivity.
We consider two ways to do so, both based on the subsample and aggregate method described in Section 2. For both variants, we first randomly partition D into M disjoint subsets, P = {D 1 , . . . , D M }, of equal size (or as close to equal as possible when n/M is not an integer). In each D l , we estimate the regression model of interest using only D l . We then compute the set of M t-statistics, {T (D 1 ), . . . , T (D M )}, for the regression coefficient of interest.
In the first adaptation, which we call the truncate-then-rescale (TR) approach, we truncate each
We then computeT
The sensitivity ofTprivate version of the t-statistic isT
The increase in global sensitivity tends to increase the noise in the privately-computed tstatistic, which could reduce its usefulness. We therefore consider a second adaptation, which we call the rescale-then-truncate (RT) approach, that has lower sensitivity. In the RT approach, we multiply each
TheT RT (P) has a sensitivity equal to 2a/M . The differentially private version isT RT, (P) =
Theoretical properties of the two adaptations
In this section, we discuss some of the theoretical properties ofT T R, (P) andT RT, (P). We focus mainly on the distributions ofT T R (P) andT RT (P). The additional Laplace noise is independent of these distributions and thus relatively straightforward to understand theoretically. To do so, we first compare the t-statistics without truncation in the partitions to T (D). We provide conditions that ensure the distribution of
is a reasonable approximation of the distribution of T (D). We then characterize how the values of M and a control the distance between the distribution of √ MT (P) and the distributions ofT RT (P) and
To begin, we treat each D l as an independent sample from the population with fixed X D l . We assume that, as withβ j from D, the distribution ofβ jl , i.e., the MLE of β j estimated with D l , given X D l can be suitably approximated by a Gaussian distribution with mean and variance equal to β j and Σ j,j (D l ), respectively, where
and X D l is the design matrix associated with D l . Treating each D l as independent samples with fixed X D l , this implies that √ MT (P) and T (D) are both Gaussian-distributed with variance equal to one. However, it is not necessarily the case that the means of each T (D l ) are equal just because the conditional means of eachβ jl are equal, nor that these means equal the mean of T (D). In particular, when β j = 0, T (D l ) is based on a smaller sample size and a different design matrix than T (D), which results in different Since each D l in actuality is drawn from a random sample from D, so long as the sample size in each partition is large it is reasonable to assume that
we take expectations of √ MT (P) conditional on the realized P. We have
Additionally, using the approximation, for any D l the
Therefore, we have
Thus, the smaller the distance between X D X D and M (X D l X D l ), the higher the correlation between √ MT (P) and T (D).
A direct application of the Markov inequality implies that
where c is an arbitrary positive constant. Thus, under the assumption that
and T (D) should be small with high probability.
We now describe how the choices of M and a affect the distance between the distribution of √ MT (P) and the distributions ofT T R (P) andT RT (P). This is equivalent to characterizing how well the distributions of
, for any l. We measure this closeness using total variation distances, which we abbreviate as d(·, ·). Let P √ M T t , P T rt and P √ M T represent the probability measures associated with
, respectively. These probability measures are defined for each D l , but we drop the reference to D l in the notation below for convenience. The measures are given by
, and φ and Φ denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the standard Gaussian distribution, respectively. Then, we have
The distance in (3) reveals that the distribution of
Intuitively, setting a large has little impact on the distribution of the truncated t-statistic. The distance in (4) shows that a has a similar effect on the distribution of
Additionally, the distribution of
Intuitively, when M decreases and a is large enough, the variance of √ M T (D l ) also decreases. This implies that √ M T (D l ) will place its probability mass mostly between −a and a. When this happens, the probability that
is high and, therefore, the distance between their distributions is small. To summarize, the distributions ofT T R (P) andT RT (P)
should get closer to that ofT (P) as a increases, and the distribution ofT RT (P) should get closer to that ofT (P) as M decreases.
The results in (3) and (4) also indicate that
Thus,T
T R (P) provides a better approximation to the distribution ofT (P) than doesT RT (P).
Taken together, these results suggest we should make a as large as possible and M as small as possible. However, the accuracy of the approximation of T (D) is only part of the story. We need to add Laplace noise to protect privacy. To maximize the usefulness of the privatelycomputed t-statistics, we seek to add as little noise as possible while still satisfying differential privacy. This pushes us to make a smaller rather than larger, and to make M larger rather than smaller. How do we trade off accuracy in the estimate ofT (P) for reductions in variance of the Laplace noise? Further, whileT T R (P) is more accurate thanT RT (P), the former has global sensitivity that is √ M times greater than the sensitivity of the latter. Which method tends to offer higher accuracy for a given risk level ? We examine these questions in the simulation studies of Section 4, and we present an approach for choosing values of M and a in Section 5. Figure 1 in the appendix displays the steps that agencies can use to releaseT T R, (P) (Algorithm 1) orT RT, (P) (Algorithm 2). The figure also describes simple Monte Carlo algorithms that can be used to approximate the sampling distributions ofT T R, (P) (Algorithm 3) and T RT, (P) (Algorithm 4). These reference distributions can be used to obtain approximate pvalues corresponding to the test statistics. Together Algorithm 1 and 3, or Algorithm 2 and 4, provide a means to perform differentially private significance tests. Inferences about the sign of β j can be obtained from the sign ofT T R, (P) orT RT, (P).
Finally, we conclude this section with a formal theorem and proof that Algorithms 1 and 2 are differentially private. 
Empirical Illustrations
We illustrate the performances of T T R, (P) and T RT, (P) in finite samples using simulation studies. These studies also illuminate the trade offs in accuracy among different values of M , a, and . In all simulations, we assume thatβ
for any j and l. We consider two scenarios, one where
, where l = 1, . . . , M -which we refer to as assumption A1-and the other where this is not necessarily the case. The scenarios are generated as follows.
In Scenario I, we work directly with the theoretical distributions of the t-statistics, without simulating and partitioning values of D. For an arbitrary regression coefficient β, let µ T be the number of standard deviations that its value is from zero. We consider multiple values of µ T in the simulation. For any µ T , we generate T ,T T R , andT RT from their sampling distributions as follows.
T ∼ N(µ T , 1),
Here, I is an indicator that equals one when the condition in its subscript is true and equals zero otherwise. We let Z l
. We then add Laplace noise based on the appropriate global sensitivity values to generateT T R, andT RT, .
Each T ,T T R , andT RT is generated independently. Generally, one would expect their values to be positively correlated when computed on some D. However, generating them independently guarantees that A1 holds. Scenario I provides lower bounds for cases where the t-statistics are positively correlated, since the three statistics should be more similar when positively correlated than when independent.
In Scenario II, we work with a subset of the March 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) public use file comprising n = 49, 436 heads of households with non-negative incomes. This dataset was used by Reiter (2005) and Chen et al. (2016) , among others. In order to use realistic predictor distributions, we set X D to be an n × 25 matrix of values derived from the CPS data. Its columns include age in years, age squared, education (16 levels), marital status (7 levels), and sex (2 levels); see Section 5 for explanations why we use these predictors. We generate multiple sets of the response variable Y from linear regressions on X D , each using a different, pre-specified set of β = (β 0 , . . . , β 24 ) , so as to control the importance of the regression coefficients. For j = 0, . . . , 24, let Σ j,j (D) be the jth diagonal element of σ 2 (X D X D ) −1 , where
672. This value of σ 2 comes from the regression described in Section 5. To derive any one β = (β 0 , . . . , β 24 ) , we set each β j = µ T Σ j,j (D) for some specified number of standard deviations µ T from zero. Using this β, we simulate realizations of T ,T T R , andT RT via the following steps.
i) For i = 1, . . . , n, generate y i from N(x i β, σ 2 ), where x i denotes the ith row-vector of
, and generate a random partition
iii) Get a realization of T = T (D) by computing the t-statistic of the jth regression coefficient estimated from D.
iv) For l = 1, . . . , M , set Z l = T (D l ) as the t-statistic of the jth regression coefficient obtained from the regression of Y on X D l . Get realizations ofT T R andT RT from (5) and (6).
We then add Laplace noise to generateT T R, andT RT, .
For both scenarios, we let µ T ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1, 2, . . . , 10}, let M ∈ {10, 25, 50, 75, 100}, let a ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, and let ∈ {0.5, 1, 2.5, 5}. We generate simulations for all possible combinations of (µ T , M, a, ). For each combination (µ T , M, a, ), we generate 100,000 realizations of (T,T T R ,T RT ) for Scenario I and 1,000 realizations for Scenario II.
We evaluate the significance tests based onT T R, andT RT, by comparing their power at each value of µ T to the power of the test based on T at each corresponding value of µ T . We evaluate the properties of the differentially private sign measures by comparing how often one can infer the correct sign of each β j from the corresponding T ,T T R, , andT RT, . We also compute the probability that a user makes the same decision about the significance level or sign when using T andT T R, orT RT, ; we call these matching probabilities.
Assessing inferences about significance
We study the significance properties of the t-statistics using the following quantities,
For a given significance level α and Type II error rate λ 0 , let r 0 and q 0 be positive constants such that p 0 (r 0 , 0) = 1 − α and p 0 (r 0 , q 0 ) = λ 0 . Notice that r 0 is the (1 − α/2)th quantile of the distribution of T when µ T = 0, i.e., r 0 is the critical value under the null hypothesis H 0 : β j = 0 that ensures a confidence level of 1 − α for the test T = I {|T |<r 0 } . The value q 0 is the number of standard deviations from zero at which the test T reaches the desired Type II error λ 0 , i.e., under H 1 : β j = q 0 Σ j,j (D), the power of this test is equal to 1 − λ 0 .
Let r T R and λ T R be positive constants such that p T R (r T R , 0, M, a, ) = 1−α and λ T R (M, a, ) = p T R (r T R , q 0 , M, a, ). For given values of (M, a, ), r T R is the critical value under H 0 that ensures a confidence level of 1 − α for the test T T R = I {|T T R, |<r T R } . The value λ T R (M, a, ) corresponds to the Type II error rate of T T R under H 1 : β j = q 0 Σ j,j (D). We define r RT and λ RT analogously.
To assess how similar the test T k is to T, where k ∈ {T R, RT }, we use the loss function,
For a given significance level α, we say there is zero loss of power from using T k when the Type II error rate of T k at q 0 is less than λ 0 . Otherwise, we record the corresponding loss of power, λ k (M, a, ) − λ 0 .
We begin by examining the values of L sig k (M, a, ), where k ∈ {T R, RT }, at the different combinations of (M, a) when = ∞, i.e., no noise is added toT T R orT RT . To save space, we present these results in the supplementary material. In Scenario I, the power for T T R and T are almost identical for a ≥ 2 for all values of M . In contrast, the power for T RT and T can differ substantially when a < 6. The power for T RT and T are most similar when a is large and M is small. These findings conform with the theory in Section 3.2. The results with the CPS data in Scenario II follow similar patterns.
We next consider < ∞, as needed to satisfy differential privacy. Figures 2 and 3 display the values of L sig k (M, a, ), where k ∈ {T R, RT }, for ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 2.5, 5.0}. In Scenario I, L sig T R tends to be smallest when M is large and a is small, and largest when M is small and a is large. In other words, the discrepancy between the power of T T R and T is smallest when the global sensitivity is smallest. This is quite different for L sig RT , which tends to be smallest when M and a are large, and largest when M and a are small. When < 5, L sig RT ≤ L sig T R for most combinations of (M, a), whereas the opposite occurs when = 5. For values of > 1, there is at least one combination of (M, a) for both T T R and T RT that provides almost no loss in power. For = 1, with T RT we need (M ≥ 50, a ≥ 6) to have only small power loss, whereas with T T R we need to set (M ≥ 50, a ≤ 3) to have only small power loss. For = 0.5, with T RT we still can achieve only modest power losses by using (M ≥ 75, a ≥ 6). However, with T T R we have to set (M = 75, a = 1), which arguably is too small a value for a to provide useful feedback on statistical significance. The reduction in power for small values of is the price of increasing the privacy level. However, we emphasize that T T R and T RT are still valid tests when is small, in that they give the correct Type I error rates regardless of . Finally, we note that the patterns in the results from Scenario II generally match those in Scenario I.
Assessing inferences about signs of coefficients
Since the sign of µ T and β j is the same, we restrict our analysis to the sign of µ T only. Because the Laplace and Student-t distributions are symmetric, we only consider the case where µ T ≥ 0. We study the sign of the statistics using the following quantities,
These represent probabilities that the t-statistics have the same sign as β j when the value of β j is γ standard deviations from zero. For a given probability α 0 , let µ 0 be a positive constant such that s 0 (µ 0 ) = α 0 , i.e., µ 0 is the number of standard deviations at which T (D) has the same sign of β j with a probability equal to α 0 . To assess how similar α 0 is to s k (µ 0 , M, a, ), where k ∈ {T R, RT }, we use the loss function
We say thatT RT are almost identical and very close to zero for all combinations of (M, a). In Scenario II, when = ∞, the values of the loss function for the two tests also are very similar. There are small differences for some combinations of (M, a) and for some regression coefficients. These differences tend to be largest when M = 100 and a is small, in which caseT T R, =∞ outperformsT RT, =∞ .
Figures 4 and 5 display results for L sgn k (M, a, ) when ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 2.5, 5.0}. In general, when ≤ 2.5,T RT, offers more combinations of (M, a) that result in accurate inferences about the sign of β j thanT T R, does, especially when a is large as would be desired in practical settings. ForT RT, , we find combinations of (M, a) that result in accurate inferences about the sign even when = 0.5, in particular when (M ≥ 50, a ≥ 6). When = 5, the results forT RT, andT T R, are practically indistinguishable when (M ≥ 50, a ≥ 6). These general findings hold for both scenarios.
Matching probabilities
We define matching probabilities as the probability that sign(T ) = sign(T k, ) and the probability that T k = T, where k ∈ {T R, RT }. We assess these probabilities using the following quantities,
where each minimum is over all possible combinations of M ∈ {10, 25, 50, 75, 100} and a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. Figure 7 summarizes the results for m sgn k (µ T , ). As expected, in both scenarios, increases in µ T correspond to increases in the matching probability. The rate at which m sgn k increases as a function of µ T depends on : the larger the , the faster the rate. In both scenarios, we observe a high matching probability (m sgn k > 0.9) when µ T ≥ 3 and ≥ 2.5. When µ T < 3, m sgn k ranges from 0.5 to 0.9 for almost all . It reaches a minimum value when µ T = 0, regardless of the value of ; however, when µ T = 0, matching the sign of T andT k, arguably is not important for interpretations. For ∈ {0.5, 1},T RT, provides better results thanT T R, , as m 
Summary: which algorithm should we use?
In most contexts, we expect analysts will want a ≥ 4 to facilitate interpretations, and data producers will want < 5 for privacy. With these values of a and , the simulations suggest usingT RT, overT T R, for both the significance and the sign of coefficients.T RT, tends to have values of the loss functions that are smaller than or equal to those forT T R, for most combinations of (M, a), especially when a is large. Additionally, the matching probabilities for T RT, dominate those forT T R, for any value of . The simulations also reveal that one should not use a small M and large a simultaneously, as this results in the least effective performance for both methods.
The simulation studies show that when M ≤ 50, there is considerable agreement between Scenario I and II, i.e., the theoretical results and what we observe when using a real-life dataset largely coincide. This agreement breaks down somewhat when M = 100. This is not surprising in the CPS data, as larger values of M lead to fewer data points in D l , which can invalidate A1. Of course, with larger sample sizes in each partition than the CPS data permit, A1 may be reasonable even for M ≥ 100 partitions, in which case one can expect more accuracy from using the larger M rather than the smaller M .
Choosing M and a Without Additional Privacy Loss
To use these differentially private test statistics, the data producer or, when permitted in a verification server, the analyst must select values for M and a. Here, we must balance competing objectives. We want a to be as small as possible to ensure low sensitivity, yet also not to be so small that the truncation results in a poor approximation of T (D) or obscures the significance of the coefficient. We want M to be as small as possible to make A1 as believable as possible, yet also M to be large to reduce the sensitivity. In this section, we present a three step approach for selecting values of (M, a) that does not incur additional privacy loss. We illustrate these steps with a regression analysis of the CPS data, using the same X D as before and the reported values of household income (on a logarithmic scale) as the response variable. This regression fits reasonably well without obvious violations of the assumption of i.i.d. Gaussian errors. We present the methodology forT RT, , as the simulation results of Section 4 preferT RT, over T T R, , with = 1.5. Similar methodology could be used withT T R, . The three-step approach also can be used for the sign.
Step 1: Fix an upper bound for L sig RT (M, a, ). To begin, the user fixes an upper bound for L sig RT (M, a, ) for their desired significance level α and Type II error rate λ 0 . By fixing α and λ 0 , it is implied that there exists q 0 > 0 such that the power of T equals (1 − λ 0 ) when β j is q 0 standard deviations from zero. Thus, the bound for L sig RT (M, a, ) represents the loss of power that a user is willing to accept by usingT RT, instead of using T when β j is q 0 standard deviations from zero. In our illustrative example, we set α = 0.05 and λ 0 = 0.2, and fix an upper bound of 0.1.
Step 2 computes simulated values of L sig RT (M, a, ) for different combinations of M and a. The user can obtain simulated values using the strategy described in Scenario I. As an example, Table 1 displays the values of L sig RT (M, a, ) for different combinations of (M, a). Of course, this table is not comprehensive; users can create different tables with different combinations of (M, a). Importantly, we do not compute the entries in Table 1 using the CPS data; this would leak information and therefore affect the noise in the t-statistics (for fixed ). When auxiliary data are available, such as synthetic data, analysts could base the tables off these auxiliary data using the strategy described in Scenario II.
Step 3: Choose (M, a). The user considers all values of (M, a) corresponding to values of L sig RT (M, a, ) below the fixed upper bound. When no combination of (M, a) satisfies this condition, the user has to sacrifice accuracy and increase their error tolerance. In our example, based on Table 1 , the user should choose the smallest values of M for which L sig RT (M, a, 1.5) is below 0.1, which is M = 25. The user then chooses the value of a that minimizes L sig RT (25, a, 1.5). From Table 1 , L sig RT (25, a, 1.5) reaches its minimum at 0.04 for T RT and a ∈ {6, 7, 8, 9}. In theory, any value of a between 6 and 9 should work. In this case, we recommend a = 9 since this high truncation level has minimal effect on the approximation to T (D).
We now illustrate this method of choosing (M, a) on the CPS data. Using (M = 25, a = 9), we compute the differentially private p-value and sign using Algorithms 2 and 4. all 25 coefficients in the regression of income on X D in the CPS data. The differentially private and confidential p-values agree substantially, resulting in essentially the same conclusions about the significance of the regression coefficients. Regarding the sign, the differentially private algorithm and observed sign agree for all coefficients except one. However, the p-value for the test H 0 : β j = 0 for this coefficient is quite large, suggesting that the change in sign is inconsequential.
As an additional illustration, we repeat the model selection and estimation using = 0.5 and upper bound equal to 0.2; detailed results are in the supplementary material. The algorithm suggests that we select (M = 100, a = 8). For estimating the signs, the differentially private algorithms continue to be effective: the privately-computed and observed signs agree on all but one of the regression coefficients. Once again, this coefficient is associated with a large p-value in both the differentially private and confidential-data tests. The results are more mixed for p-values. We see different interpretations of the significance for 3 out of 25 coefficients. These tend to be coefficients with p-values between .02 and .10 in the confidential-data regression. We conjecture why this occurs when discussing the results in the supplementary material. Of course, interpretations about the quality of the results for different (M, a) and are data-specific, and we expect lower reductions in data quality for D with larger sample size.
Concluding Remarks
Using the methods described here, data producers can provide differentially private answers to queries about statistical significance and signs of coefficients in linear regression models. With judicious choice of (M, a) via the algorithms presented here, analysts can have high confidence that they will arrive at valid conclusions from the private statistics. We expect that these methods can be applied to other regression models. The key assumptions are A1 and thatβ j can be approximated by normal distributions, which is certainly the case for many models.
Both algorithms provide results for one β j at a time. If analysts are given a finite privacy budget, they must spend part of that budget for each coefficient they wish to verify. Thus, a key area for research is to develop differentially private algorithms that allow queries for multiple test statistics without burning through the privacy budget too quickly.
Supplementary Material
The online supplementary materials contain additional plots associated with Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 and present p-values and signs related to the examples considered in Section 5. 
